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Recipe for Victory 
The Fight for Hill 677 During the 
Battle of the Kap'yong River, 
24-25 April 1951 
Brent Watson 
During the night of 24-25 April 1951, the Second Battalion, Princess Patricia's 
Canadian Light Infantry fought what became the 
most famous Canadian battle of the Korean War. 
Outnumbered and isolated, the Princess Pats 
repulsed wave after wave of attacking Chinese 
infantry from their positions atop Hill 677 
overlooking the Kap'yong River Valley. Although 
a comparatively minor episode in the broader 
context of the Korean War, Canadian retention of 
Hil1677 made an important contribution to the 
Commonwealth victory at Kap'yong. More 
significantly, the fight for Hill677 was clearly the 
most successful set-piece engagement fought by 
the Canadians in Korea. 1 In recognition of their 
achievement, the Princess Pats were awarded the 
United States Presidential Unit Citation- the only 
Canadian unit ever to earn this distinction. 
Although clearly an important event for the 
Canadians, the fight for Hill677 has received little 
scholarly attention in Canada. 2 Commonwealth 
historians, in contrast, have been busy. 
Examining the action from the perspective of the 
New Zealand gunners who supported the 
Canadians, Ian MacGibbon suggested that 
artillery fire was the key to victory, and saved the 
beleaguered Patricias from certain defeat.~ 
Although supporting fire, including that from the 
Canadians themselves, was the single most 
important factor in the successful defence of Hill 
677, it was by no means the only one. An 
operational analysis of the battle reveals that the 
Second World War experiences of the Patricias' 
senior officers, the specialized nature of the 
battalion's pre-battle training program, high 
morale, and the failure of the enemy to co-
ordinate and press his attack also helped to make 
the Canadian stand possible. 
* * * * * 
Canada played a leading role in the creation of the United Nations in June 1945. Only five 
years later Canadians learned that membership 
in the international organization did not come 
without a price. When the Security Council 
passed a resolution requesting member states 
to provide military forces for the defence of South 
Korea, the Canadian government responded in 
the affirmative. 
Though the politicians were ready to go to 
war in Korea, the Canadian Army was not. Post-
war defence cuts had reduced the infantry 
component of the Army Active Force to only three 
under strength battalions. Tasked with the 
defence of the entire Canadian land mass, this 
skeleton of an army could spare precious few of 
its soldiers to meet Canada's Korean 
commitment. Caught on the horns of an 
increasingly embarrassing dilemma, the 
government decided to quickly recruit, from the 
streets, an all-volunteer special force "for use in 
carrying out Canada's obligations under the 
United Nations Charter.'4 
The formation of the Canadian Army Special 
Force (subsequently renamed the 25th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade Group) was authorized on 7 
August 1950. The following day a full-page 
recruiting ad in the nation's major newspapers 
announced: "The Canadian Army Wants Men 
Now ... to meet aggression in accordance with the 
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United Nations Charter." Preference would be 
given to veterans of the Second World War, and 
the term of enlistment was for eighteen months. 
The core of the 25th Brigade would consist of 
second battalions of the three Active Force 
infantry regiments- the Royal22e Regiment, the 
Royal Canadian Regiment, and the Princess 
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI). 
Mobilizing second battalions of these 
renowned regiments served a dual purpose. First, 
the units of the 25th Brigade could "latch on to 
their parent formations thereby expediting 
training and organization."5 Second, the Active 
Force units would quickly instill the requisite 
regimental ethos in their respective second 
additions- an important consideration, given the 
fact that it can take a newly formed unit years to 
develop the esprit de corps necessary for the 
maintenance of high morale under adverse 
battlefield conditions. Initial strength of the 25th 
Brigade was set at 4960 all ranks, plus a 
reinforcement pool of 2105. 6 Despite initial 
concerns that the high level of employment would 
lead to a shortage of recruits, "there was no 
difficulty at all" in finding men to fill the ranks of 
the 25th Brigade. 7 
Thus 2 PPCLI came into being. In the days 
following the Canadian government's call to arms, 
a cadre from the lst Battalion, Princess Patricia's 
Canadian Light Infantry ( 1 PPCLI) commenced 
drafting and setting up a training program for 
the 2nd Battalion at the Currie Barracks, 
8 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. 
Stone. commanding olficer 
qf the 2nd Battalion. 
Princess Patricia's 
Canadian Light lf1fantry. 
Stone had a distinguished 
record in the Second World 
War rising .from the rank Q[ 
private to commanding 
officer Q[ the Loyal 
Edmonton Regiment in 
1944. His skill as a 
commander continued in 
Korea 
southwest of Calgary, Alberta. As the enlisted men 
of 2 PPCLI completed basic military training, 
their officers, all of whom were either veterans 
of the Second World War or serving members of 
the Canadian Army, were undergoing a refresher 
course at Calgary.8 Command of the battalion was 
given to Lieutenant-Colonel James R. Stone, 
DSO, MC, one of the most capable fighting 
soldiers in Canadian military history. Born in 
England in 1909, Stone immigrated to Canada 
at the age of 18. Most of his pre-military life was 
spent in Alberta's Peace River country where he 
worked as a farmer and forest ranger. With the 
outbreak of the Second World War, Stone enlisted 
as a private in the Loyal Edmonton Regiment; 
by 1944, then a Lieutenant-Colonel, he was in 
command of the unit. 
As a junior infantry officer in the Sicilian 
campaign, Stone participated in the bloody 
fighting down the Agira and Simeto valleys. It was 
here that he learned the tactics of hilltop defence 
from the masters themselves, the German Army. 
More importantly, perhaps, Stone's combat 
e:x.lJeriences in Sicily and, later, Italy, imbued him 
with an eye for vital ground- a tactical skill that 
is essential to the successful planning and 
conduct of operations in mountainous terrain. 9 
Stone's ability to identify vital ground would 
figure prominently in the Patricias' successful 
stand at Kap'yong. 
By the beginning of October, 1383 other 
ranks were undergoing training with 2 PPCLI. 10 
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While most of the battalion was made up of men 
who specifically enlisted for service in Korea, the 
majority of warrant officers and sergeants were 
from 1 PPCLI. Nearly 75 percent of the enlisted 
men had some prior military experience. 
Approximately half of this figure had served with 
the Canadian Army in the Second World War; 
the other half had either cadet or militia 
experience. 11 The average age of the Second World 
War veterans was 26, while that for the rest of 
the battalion's enlisted men was 20. 12 
For the next month training was carried out 
on a seven day, three night per week basis. 
However, as the Patricias prepared for battle it 
appeared as if they might not be needed in Korea 
afterall. On 15 September 1950, after two months 
of bitter fighting along the Pusan perimeter, 
United Nations forces under the command of 
General Douglas MacArthur captured the 
strategic port city of Inchon and began a rapid 
advance up the Korean peninsula. With the North 
Korean People's Army on the brink of defeat, 
there was talk that the war would be over by 
Christmas. Consequently, the Canadian 
government reduced its planned contribution of 
a brigade group, and decided to send only one 
battalion of infantry to "show the nag" and assist 
with any UN occupation duties. 13 The battalion 
was 2 PPCLI. 14 
When the Patricias boarded their troop 
transport for Korea in late November, they had 
yet to undergo collective infantry training. 15 In 
other words, 2 PPCLI was untrained as a fighting 
unit. In fact. at the time of embarkation the rille 
companies - Able, Baker, Charlie, and Dog 
companies~ had not even started their respective 
collective training programs. Initially, few were 
troubled by 2 PPCLI's training deficiencies; there 
would be time to complete collective training once 
the battalion arrived in Korea. However, as the 
Canadians crossed the international date line, 
the war in Korea was changing for the worse. On 
24 November, MacArthur launched a general 
offensive across the UN front. As his troops 
moved northward, they encountered stiff 
resistance from Chinese Communist Forces 
(CCF) who had crossed into Korea in mid-
October. Although they had appeared on the 
battlefield in considerable numbers shortly after 
this, the UN Command was slow to recognize 
Chinese involvement. 16 
This time, however, it was different. On 26 
November, the Chinese launched a massive 
counter-offensive in the West, followed two days 
later by an equally large attack in the East. 
Division after division of UN and Republic of 
Korea (ROK) forces was either destroyed or 
forced to make a hasty retreat in the face of the 
Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 
exercising aboard the USNS Joe P. Martinez en route to Korea, November 1950. 
9 
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Troops qf "B" Company, 2 PPCLI crossing a log bridge, February 1951. 
advancing CCF juggernaut. Suddenly, the 
occupation duties assigned to the half-trained 
Patricias ceased to exist. The battalion would see 
combat, after all. 
Within this context, 2 PPCLI's training 
deficiencies assumed a new significance. 
However, as much as the officers fretted over the 
future operational employment of the battalion, 
little could be done to rectify the situation until 
the unit reached Korea. 
On 18 December the Patricias' troop ship 
docked at Pusan Harbour, and the 918 men of 
the battalion proceeded, by US Army transport, 
to their staging camp on Yang-Do Island. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stone, meanwhile, reported 
to 8th Army headquarters where he received 
instructions to move his battalion to a "training 
area" at Suwon, only 50 miles south of the fluid 
battleline. 17 From Suwon, the Patricias would 
move forward and join the 29th British Infantry 
Brigade (29th BIB), which was occupying a 
reserve position behind the Imjin River defences 
north ofSeoul. 1 ~ Apparently, the Americans were 
attempting to use 2 PPCLI as part of the 8th 
Army's reserve, before it completed collective 
training. Stone "queried the advisability" of 
moving within earshot "of an unstable front with 
green troops, particularly as the general idea was 
for [the Patricias] to patrol against guerilla forces 
10 
in the area." 19 Despite Stone's caveats, the 8th 
Army G-3 (operations) officer refused to grant 2 
PPCLI the eight weeks' training time Stone 
considered necessary. 
Stone, however, still had an ace up his sleeve. 
Before 2 PPCLI left for Korea, the Canadian 
government had issued him with command 
instructions designed to eschew potential 
American intransigence. Incensed by the G-3 
officer's unwillingness to appreciate his position, 
Stone flew to Seoul to confront Lieutenant-
General (Bulldog) Walker, commander of the 8th 
Army. 
Judging from his dealings with the G-3 
officer, Stone expected his meeting with Walker 
to be somewhat less than congenial. To Stone's 
surprise, Bulldog Walker "was very gracious," and 
listened sympathetically as the Canadian outlined 
the state of 2 PPCLI's training. 20 Walker, however, 
refused to grant Stone his eight weeks' training, 
correctly arguing that 2 PPCLI was as well trained 
as the American units currently holding the line 
against the Chinese advance. It soon became clear 
to Stone that Walker and his staff were unaware 
of his command instructions. 21 When Stone 
produced a copy of his orders, Walker was 
disappointed that the unit was not ready for 
immediate operational employment. and agreed 
to give them eight weeks to prepare for battle. 2~ 
4
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Soldiers from 2 PPCLI fire their mortar during training at Miryang, Korea, February 1951. 
While Stone was in Seoul, the men of2 PPCLI 
were busy drawing winter kit and uncrating their 
equipment. At this time, 2 PPCLI, now on US 
Army scale, was issued with its new American-
pattern support weapons and vehicles. Prior to 
Korea, the Canadian infantry had been outfitted 
almost exclusively with equipment of British 
design or manufacture. However, as the 25th 
Brigade prepared for battle it became obvious 
that some of the infantry's British-pattern 
equipment would have to be replaced 
immediately, lest the brigade's operational 
capabilities be compromised. Situation reports 
from the 27th British Commonwealth Infantry 
Brigade (27th BCIB), the first Commonwealth 
formation to see action in Korea, regularly 
described engagements during which enemy 
mortars outranged the 27th Brigade's 3-inch 
mortars by as much as 2,000 yards. 2 :1 In view of 
the 27th BCIB's operational experience, the 
Department of National Defence decided to 
replace most of the Canadian infantry's British-
pattern support weapons with the very latest in 
American military hardware. Thus, with the 
exception of the venerable Vickers Medium 
Machine-Gun (MMG), for which the Americans 
possessed no superior alternative, all of the 
infantry support weapons to see service with the 
Canadians in Korea were of American origin. 
The most significant of these new American arms 
and equipment were the 81 mm and 60 mm 
mortars, and the M3A1 half-track. 2'~ The 81 mm 
mortar was a battalion support weapon; its 
primary purpose was to kill enemy personnel. 25 
Due to their substantial weight ( 107 pounds each, 
not including ammunition), 2 PPCLI's six 81 mm 
mortars were mounted for travelling on twelve 
M3A1 half-tracks. Each half-track mounted one 
.50 and one .30 calibre Browning machine-gun 
which could be dismounted to provide protection 
for the mortar and its crew during a fire task. 
The 60 mm mortar was essentially a smaller 
version of the 81 mm mortar. "An integral weapon 
invariably going into position with the riOe 
company," the 60 mm mortar provided the 
company commander with immediate indirect 
fire support. 26 The weapon could fire a high 
explosive bomb to a maximum range of 1939 
yards27 - nearly five times further than the 
weapon it supplanted in Canadian service. The 
60 mm mortar's maximum range would be used 
with devastating effect on Hill677. 
By the beginning of January, the Patricia rifle 
companies were finally able to begin collective 
training. In the words of the 1950 Canadian Army 
Manual of Training, Trainingjor War, "collective 
training means exercises and manoeuvres, the 
keynote to both being realism."28 Accordingly, the 
immediate objective of the Patricias' collective 
program was to inure the men against the 
ll 
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physical hardships of the Korean battlefield. 
Reports from the front continually emphasized 
the need for troops to "be conditioned for hill 
climbing, man pack carrying, and living under 
adverse climatic conditions. "29 To this end, the 
Patricias moved to a training camp astride the 
Miryang River, fifty miles north of Pusan. In the 
rugged mountains above Miryang, the soldiers 
of 2 PPCLI received their first real taste of the 
difficult, and at times unforgiving, Korean 
battlescape. 
In addition to raising the level of physical 
fitness in the battalion, the hill climbing and cross 
country movement exercises above Miryang 
taught the men the tactical necessity of 
dominating the high ground overlooking the 
valley floors. Moreover, these exercises 
incorporated the tactical lessons learned by the 
29th BIB during the previous month's fighting. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stone had first met Brigadier 
Brodie, commander of the 29th BIB, during his 
December visit to 8th Army headquarters in 
Seoul. Brodie and Stone discussed in detail the 
action fought by the Northumberland Fusiliers 
at Sibyon-Ni. Just before dawn on 30 November, 
the Chinese had attacked the Northumberlands, 
who were dug in, on the high ground, in mutually 
supporting company "islands" of defence. The 
Northumberlands had been forced to deploy in 
this manner because the mountainous terrain 
precluded a tight battalion position. In the 
ensuing battle, they beat back the numerically 
superior Chinese force with the loss of only 14 
British casualties.3° Commenting on his meeting 
with Brigadier Brodie, Stone wrote: 
It seems apparent that resolute men, dug in, in 
proper islands of defence can kill at will, the 
hordes that rush the positions ... .Infiltration 
between [company islands] must be expected, 
but with all areas defended such infiltration is 
not serious. The Chinese ... rely on massed 
movement of infantry ... to overrun opposition. 
Such should be a defender's paradise provided 
troops are all trained marksmen and realize that 
if they run, they will certainly die .... It is my 
intention to commence [collective] training with 
particular emphasis on defence .... 'J 1 
For the next six weeks, the Patricia rifle 
companies scrambled to master the tactics of 
mountain fighting in Korea. A typical training 
exercise during this period saw the rifle 
companies advance into the mountains in the 
morning, and occupy hilltop defensive positions 
12 
for the night. During these exercises the "enemy" 
(Sniper and Intelligence sections) made extensive 
use ofTNTcharges, live tracer rounds, and para-
flares in an attempt to familiarize the defending 
riflemen with the audio and visual characteristics 
of the battlefield. Following the detonation of 
randomly placed TNT charges, the Sniper and 
Intelligence sections directed live fire on to a 
feature immediately next to the company areas. 
After several minutes of firing, live rounds were 
exchanged for blanks, and the "enemy" launched 
harassing and probing attacks against the 
company positions. As it turned out, the Sniper 
and Intelligence sections were seldom able to 
infiltrate the company areas in strength. In an 
interview with a Canadian war correspondent the 
morning after the successful "defence" of his 
company's position, a Dog company soldier 
boldly commented, "If the nights area as black 
as that one, I defy any Chinese to get me out of 
my hole. You'd just sit tight and knock them out 
as they go by."32 
Recalling that the "enemy" during these sham 
battles were, alas, armed only with blanks, and 
that the erstwhile opposing forces often 
conducted joint debriefings over quart-sized 
bottles of beer, the Dog company soldier's 
buoyant optimism is not surprising. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the training 
exercises in the mountains above Miryang should 
not be discounted. For it was during these 
exercises that the soldiers of 2 PPCLI mastered 
the tactics that were to figure so prominently in 
their successful stand at Kap'yong. 
Ironically, after devoting a disproportionate 
amount of training time to the tactics of hilltop 
defence, it was the tactical offence that dominated 
the Canadians' first encounters with the enemy. 
On 17 February the Patricias, having completed 
their collective training, came under the 
operational command of the 27th BCIB. When 2 
PPCLijoined the 27th Brigade it consisted of two 
British battalions- the lst Battalion, Middlesex 
Regiment, and the lst Battalion, Argyle and 
Sutherland Highlanders- and the 3rd Battalion, 
Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR). 33 The 16th 
New Zealand Field Regiment ( 16 NZFR) and the 
60th Indian (Parachute) Field Ambulance 
provided artillery and medical support. 
The next two months saw the 27th Brigade 
inch its way slowly northward as part of the 9th 
6
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Right: Two soldiers from 2 PPCLI survey the terrain, 
17 Aprill951. 
Below: A sectionfrom 2 PPCLI leaves a regrouping 
point,[ or an enemy-held position, 24 February 
1951. The mountainous nature of Korea is 
evident in this photo. 
US Corps' advance to the 38th parallel. During 
this period the Patricias launched a series of 
company-sized attacks against Chinese rear 
guard positions with decidedly mixed results. 
After an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge expertly 
camouflaged Chinese troops from their positions 
atop Hill 532, Dog company suffered 34 
casualties in only nine hours offighting.:34 
When not dodging Chinese bullets, or, in one 
instance, a misdirected napalm strike,:35 the men 
of 2 PPCLI had to contend with blizzards, ice-
covered hillsides, perpetually wet clothing, 
monotonous food, unpotable water (and the 
diarrhea that often accompanies it), blisters, 
biting pack straps, and the innumerable other 
discomforts that comprise the infantryman's lot. 
But no matter how arduous their stint at the front 
became. they could take solace in knowing that 
""' their regular rotation out of the line would be :;;; 
punctuated by hot meals, warm baths, and cold ~ 
beer. lt was during one of these respites from the ~ 
fighting that 2 PPCLI received orders to establish '-! 
defensive positions astride the Kap'yong River. ~ 
* * * * * 
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D uring the 8th Army's general advance to the 38th parallel evidence accrued "of a 
formidable enemy build-up" opposite the 1st and 
9th US Corps' fronts. 36 By 20 April it was 
apparent that the enemy was preparing for a 
renewed offensive, as fresh formations from the 
2nd and 3rd CCF Field Armies occupied the line 
facing UN forces. Just before midnight on 22 
April, the Chinese launched a full-scale offensive 
across the width of the UN front. In the 9th Corps 
sector, the weight of the attack fell on the 6th 
ROK Division. Unable to hold the line against 
the advancing Chinese juggernaut and in danger 
of being cut off, the South Koreans fell back 
through the Kap'yong River valley. 
In the early morning of 23 April, the 27th 
BCIB was ordered to take up blocking positions 
above the Kap'yong. :17 The 2 PPCLI were to occupy 
defensive positions in the vicinity of Hill 677 
(referred to simply as "Six-Seven-Seven"), 
covering the approacl;les from the north and 
north east of the heightY8 
At 0800 hours on 23 April, Lieutenant-
Colonel Stone and the battalion Intelligence 
Officer (10) left for 27th Brigade headquarters 
for a preliminary Orders ("0") Group. On their 
return, a battalion "0" group was held, and the 
CO, IO. company commanders, MMG officer, 
Mortar officer, Signals Officer and Artillery Officer 
departed for a reconnaissance ofHill677.:m After 
starting out in the wrong direction, the Patricia 
reconnaissance group reached the northern 
approaches to Hill677, where they were afforded 
a clear view of the position the battalion was to 
occupy across the valley. Stone recalled: 
.... we wenl to the enemy side of the hill and 
looked at the hill from the enemy's point of view. 
I kept thinking that if I was the one trying to 
take the hill, I would move in such and such 
direction, and so on .... ! then decided which way 
the attack would come and deployed the 
battalion accordingly. 40 
Following another "0" Group, the company 
commanders proceeded to reconnoitre the areas 
assigned to them. At the same time, the IO 
conducted a reconnaissance of the approaches 
leading to the battalion position from the south-
east ofHill677. The IO discovered a tactical road, 
constructed by the Americans, which led to the 
position chosen for Battalion Tactical 
Headquarters (Bn Tac HQ). From Tac HQ, trails 
14 
following the ridge lines of Hill 677 led to the 
company areas. 41 
At 1800 hours Stone called a final "0" Group, 
and the battalion was ordered to prepare for the 
move to Hill 677. The rifle companies went 
forward in vehicles to the village ofTungmudae, 
approximately one mile south of Hill 677. The 
move to Tungmudae was completed without 
incident, although the sight of panic-stricken 
ROK soldiers fleeing past the Patricia column did 
not inspire confidence. A soldier in Able company 
recollected: 
There was just a stream of Koreans heading 
south and we were heading north .... These guys 
were coming out as if they were piling out of a 
bank building .... I've never seen fear and 
disorganization like those guys going down the 
road. It was on for hours and it wasn't all that 
encouraging.42 
From Tungmudae, the rifle companies moved to 
their positions on foot. With each man packing 
his personal weapon, several hundred rounds of 
ammunition, grenades, an entrenching tool, a full 
water bottle, and a 24 hour field ration pack- in 
addition to his personal kit- the soldiers in the 
Patricia rifle companies reached their positions 
utterly exhausted. To make matters worse, many 
in the battalion were nursing wicked hangovers, 
as the evening of 22 April had been spent 
clustered around bon fires imbibing bottles of 
Labatt's lager. 4 :1 Nevertheless, by 2200 hours the 
rifle companies were digging in on the north face 
ofHill677. 
On Hill677, the Patricia rifle companies were 
deployed as follows: Able company on the right 
flank, covering the approaches leading north and 
east from the battalion position; Charlie company 
along the ridge line of Hill 677, in the centre of 
the battalion area; Dog company on the left flank, 
covering the approaches leading west from the 
battalion position; and Baker company on the 
ridge line to the north of Dog company, covering 
the approaches immediately north of the 
battalion position. Able, Baker, and Dog 
companies were allotted one section of MMGs 
each, at two Vickers guns per section. 
Nearly a mile and a half wide, gullied and 
wooded, Hill 677 was practically "impossible to 
defend in the classic manner of deploying 
companies to support each other. '"1 ~ 
8
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Small Korean village at the eastern base of Hill 677. 
Consequently, each rifle company was 
responsible for its own defended locality, with 
platoons deployed to be mutually supporting. 
Gaps between the "company islands" were 
covered by defensive fire (OF) tasks of the MMG 
sections, the battalion mortars, and the field guns 
of supporting artillery units which included not 
only the 16 NZFR, but also several American 9th 
Corps artillery formations. 45 Owing to the 
steepness of the terrain, it was extremely difficult 
to co-ordinate all of the Patricias' supporting 
weapons into a coherent battalion fire plan.46 The 
gradient of Hill 677 is so steep in some places 
that one must crawl on hands and knees, as this 
author discovered firsthand during a recent 
research sojoum to the battle site. This steepness 
restricted MMG, mortar and artillery OF tasks 
to the main ridge line approaches to the 
Canadians' positions. Approaches leading to the 
company and platoon positions between the main 
ridge lines had to be covered by small arms fire 
and hand grenades. 
Meanwhile, Bn Tac HQ, the Mortar platoon 
and the Pioneer platoon, proceeded via the 
tactical road to their positions on the rear slope 
of Hill 677 overlooking the village of 
Tungmudae. 47 The move began at 2130 hours, 
but was delayed due to the inability of the Mortar 
platoon's half-tracks to negotiate the narrow 
corners of the tactical road. The Pioneer platoon 
widened the track with a series of well-placed 
808 plastic explosive charges, but the move was 
further delayed when one of the half-tracks 
experienced a mechanical break down. 
By 0300 hours on 24 April, Mortar platoon 
was base-plated and ready for action; an hour 
later Bn Tac HQ was operational. 48 Thanks to 
the Pioneer platoon and a Patricia motor 
mechanic, all of the Mortar platoon's half-tracks 
completed the move to the base plate position, 
bringing 2100 rounds of mortar ammunition 
forward at one time. 49 Now in position, the 
Patricias prepared their defences. The twenty-
four .30 and .50 calibre Browning machine guns 
carried on the Mortar platoon's twelve half-tracks 
were dismounted and deployed to cover the 
approaches leading into the rear of the Bn Tac 
HQ area and battalion positions from the village 
ofTugmudae. As a further precaution, all Support 
company personnel were assigned defensive 
positions and a "girdle ofNo.36 grenades set with 
tripwires" was laid along the Bn Tac HQ 
perimeter. 50 
For the rest of the night, the men of 2 PPCLI 
scrambled to prepare for the expected Chinese 
onslaught. Defensive positions were hurriedly 
constructed, trip flares were strung, weapons and 
equipment were checked, communications wire 
was laid and OF tasks were arranged and 
registered. Meanwhile, 3 RAR took up defensive 
positions across the Kap'yong River valley on Hill 
504, on the right of the 27th Brigade front. By 
2200 hours on 23 April, the Australians were 
15 
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being heavily engaged by the leading elements of 
the 118th CCF Division. 51 Wave after wave of CCF 
grenadiers and "burp-gunners" supported by 
mortar fire, rushed the Australian positions. 
From their higher vantage point across the valley, 
the Patricias could only watch and wait. For some, 
this was the most trying time of the impending 
battle. Mouths became dry with anticipation, 
hearts began to beat wildly, and more than a few 
men were gripped by a sudden urge to urinate. 5 2 
According to Lieutenant Brian Munro, an Able 
company platoon commander, "Panic spread like 
an electrical current, bouncing from slit trench 
to slit trench. The men began to change positions 
amongst themselves, wanting to fight and die with 
a buddy. "5:1 However, a series of expletive-laced 
shouts of encouragement from Sergeant Tommy 
Prince54 and the other company NCOs, gradually 
helped the men to regain their composure. 55 
By 0200 hours on 24 April, the lateral 
communication line between 2 PPCLI and 3 RAR 
was cut. Henceforth only wireless communication 
between the Australians and Canadians was 
possible. At one point, the Chinese severed the 
direct communications link between 3 RAR and 
27th Brigade HQ, and messages had to be relayed 
through 2 PPCLI via the battalions' wireless 
sets. 56 
Fearing that his right flank would be left open 
to attack if the Australians failed to hold their 
positions on Hill 504, Stone redeployed Baker 
company. He ordered Major Vince Lilley and his 
men to move from their position north of Dog 
company, "which was partly dug in, and dig in 
several hundred yards to the right where they 
could overlook the valley of the Kap'yong. "57 The 
redeployment was executed just in time. However, 
during the move a company of American tanks 
from the US 72 Tank Battalion who were 
supporting the 3 RAR mistook Baker company 
for the Chinese and opened fire. Fortunately, only 
one man was slightly wounded. 
By 0900 hours, after nearly eleven hours of 
intense fighting, the 3 RAR was in disarray. In 
hindsight, it is clear that the odds were stacked 
against 3 RAR's successful defence ofHill504. 
The feature was lower, and hence much easier to 
attack, than Hill 677, and during the battle 
several regiments from the 6th ROK Division 
conducted a disorderly withdrawal through the 
Australian positions. As the Chinese stepped up 
their attacks against 3 RAR's flanks, the 
Australian rifle platoons were forced to withdraw 
into tight groups in the centre of their respective 
company areas. 58 This move precluded any 
further attempts to restore the positions that had 
been overrun. 59 With his companies now 
completely isolated, and his communications 
disrupted and command posts over-run, 
Lieutenant -Colonel Ferguson, CO of 3 RAR, could 
no longer control the battle nor co-ordinate the 
battalion's fire support. Fearing that the 3 RAR 
could not withstand another night of Chinese 
attacks, Ferguson relinquished command and 
instructed his company commanders- on orders 
from the Brigade Commander himself - to 
execute a fighting withdrawal. 60 That the 3 RAR 
rifle companies were able to execute this 
manoeuvre while continuing to inflict heavy losses 
on the enemy testifies to the courage and 
determination of the Australian soldier at 
Kap'yong. 
By 1100 hours 2 PPCLI's Baker company was 
in position. There was little activity along the 
Patricias' front during the remaining daylight 
hours of 24 April, save for the occasional Chinese 
reconnaissance party. 61 As darkness began to 
descend, Brigadier Burke, commander of the 
27th Brigade, flew over the Patricia positions in 
a loudspeaker-equipped Douglas Dakota. Burke 
wished the men well, and told them that they 
were going to have to fight the impending battle 
on their own. According to Lieutenant Brian 
Munro, Burke's aerial broadcast ended with 
some generic "stiff-upper-lip" words of 
encouragement. 62 Not surprisingly, Brigadier 
Burke's brief appearance high over the battlefield 
attracted the scorn of the soldiers in the firing 
line. 63 Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Burke's 
fly-by did much to steel the nerves of the men on 
the ground, and his well-meaning words of 
encouragement probably only served to reinforce 
their apprehension about the coming battle. 
At 2130 hours, Baker company came under 
light mortar and MMG fire; minutes later a 
concentration of approximately 400 Chinese was 
observed forming up for an attack below the 
company's forward platoon position. 6~ Major 
Lilley immediately called for mortar and artillery 
support. However, mortar and artillery fire could 
not stop the impending Chinese attack. By 2200 
hours the forward platoon was under attack; 
thirty minutes later, Lieutenant H. Ross, the 
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The author in front Q[ the Baker company position. Battalion Tactical 
Headquarters was locatedjust behind the ridgeline to the author's right. 
platoon commander, reported that his position 
was partially over-run. Fearing the platoon would 
be completely over-run and cut off, Major Lilley 
ordered Ross and his men to fix bayonets and 
fall back into the main company position. 
Most of Lieutenant Ross' platoon reached the 
main company defence perimeter unscathed. 
Others were not so lucky. A Patricia from Baker 
company recounted: 
[Lieutenant] Ross gave us the order to move 
out. Just as we jumped up Ross added that 
anyone with ammo left should cover the retreat 
of the wounded. I had three shells left so I 
dropped back down and fired them off. Just as 
I jumped up again I fell over a Chinaman who 
was running up the side of the hill. He let fly 
and got me in the neck then ran into the end of 
my bayonet.r'" 
While a fierce fire fight raged between Baker 
company and the attacking Chinese, a body of 
enemy troops attempted to infiltrate the battalion 
area behind Lieutenant-Colonel Stone's Tac HQ.66 
The Mortar platoon's .30 and .50 calibre 
Browning machine-guns were promptly called 
into action to meet the threat. Stone recollected: 
18 
Ammunition belts for [the .30 and .50 calibre 
Browning machine-guns] were loaded with one 
tracer bullet to four ball, or ordinary bullets. 
Fire was held until the Chinese had broken 
through the trees about two hundred meters 
away. Twenty-four machine guns cut loose 
together. Only those who have experienced being 
under the fire of a heavy concentration of tracer 
bullets can appreciate the terror induced by that 
kind and volume of fire. With the crack of the 
machine guns, and the 81 mm mortars firing at 
their shortest range, the enemy never hada 
chance.67 
Indeed, when the Able company rear platoon 
began firing what Stone considered to be 
unnecessarily long bursts of light machine-gun 
(LMG) fire in support of Bn Tac HQ, the CO 
radioed the company second-in-command and 
rejoined, "stop your firing, you bloody fool! We 
can take care of ourselves. Save your 
ammunition; you're going to need it!"6e Having 
successfully staved off the attack against Bn Tac 
HQ, the Mortar Platoon's .50 calibre heavy 
machine-guns were turned on a large body of 
Chinese troops fording the Kap'yong River. 
Silhouetted by the bright moonlight. the Chinese 
were mowed down in swaths by the powerful guns 
at a range of approximately 800 metres. 69 
Seventy-one Chinese dead were counted on the 
banks of the Kap'yong River the next morning. 70 
At this point, it is instructive to outline the 
assault tactics the Chinese employed against 2 
PPCLI at Kap'yong. Save for a light preliminary 
mortar bombardment and MMG fire, the Chinese 
attacks against Hill 677 were executed without 
fire support. Consequently, the Chinese were 
forced to move as close to the Canadian positions 
as possible, using the cover of darkness to 
maximum advantage, where they waited for the 
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signal to initiate the attack. Lacking battlefield 
wireless communications, the Chinese assault 
troops were directed against their objectives with 
bugles and tracer rounds. Armed with "burp" 
guns and concussion grenades, the Chinese 
attempted to overrun the Canadian positions 
quickly by sheer weight of numbers, and working 
around the flanks. 
At 0030 hours on 25 April, Dog company 
reported enemy movement to the west and north 
of 10 platoon, the company's westernmost 
platoon. 71 Several probing attacks were launched 
against 10 platoon, but they were driven off by 
MMG, mortar and artillery fire. An hour later, a 
cacophony of Chinese bugles was heard and the 
scarlet rods of tracer bullets lit up the sky, 
signalling the start of an all-out Chinese attack 
against Lieutenant M.G. Levy's 10 platoon. 
By 0230 hours, "every weapon in the 
battalion was firing" on the estimated 200 
Chinese converging on 10 platoon from three 
sides. 72 According to the Canadian official history, 
the attack on 10 platoon was carried out with 
such speed and momentum that the Chinese were 
able to over-run the MMG section from 12 platoon 
supporting 10 platoon.T1 Oral sources, however, 
cast doubt on at least part ofthis interpretation. 
A veteran of 11 platoon recently reported that 
his section was firing in the vicinity of the No. 1 
gun during the attack, and that its crew may have 
been hit by "friendly" Bren gun fire. 74 In any event, 
the two Patricias manning the No. 1 gun were 
killed at their post, and both MMGs were 
temporarily lost to the enemy. 
Unable to overrun the 10 platoon positions, 
the enemy pressed his attack against 12 platoon, 
situated in a saddle between 10 and 11 
platoons. 75 At this time, the 16 NZFR was 
engaging a DF task in front of the Dog company 
positions "continuously at the slow rate of fire 
(two rounds per gun per minute) instead of 
simply firing a designated number ofrounds."76 
As the Australian official historian observed, at 
this rate of fire, "twenty-four rounds exploded 
every thirty seconds in a target area some 150-
200 metres across."77 With the New Zealanders 
running low on 25 pounder ammunition, the 
Patricias' supporting fire was soon reduced to 
the "very slow" rate (one round per gun per 
minute). The Chinese, however, continued to 
press their attack against 12 platoon, forcing the 
Patricias to request a return to the "slow" rate of 
fire. 78 
Despite the sterling service rendered by the 
gunners, 10 platoon was cut-off; 12 platoon was 
overrun, and forced to withdraw to Dog company 
HQ. In view of the increasingly grave situation, 
the acting commander of Dog company, Captain 
Wally Mills, called for artillery fire on his own 
position. 79 After assuring the CO that his men 
were well dug in below ground level, Mills was 
granted his request. For approximately twenty 
minutes, artillery pounded the Dog company 
positions. The shrapnel shells, packed with steel 
balls, were fused to burst several metres above 
the ground. The fire had the desired effect, 
sending thousands of steel balls and white-hot 
shell fragments whistling through the inky 
blackness, decimating the Chinese ranks. Having 
driven the attackers from the Dog company 
locality, the gunners turned their attention to the 
approaches leading to the company positions. 
Forty minutes had passed since the first 
shrapnel shells rained down on the Dog company 
positions. In total, the action required "some 
2300 rounds" from the 16 NZFR's 25 pounder 
field guns, Ro "and many thousands of Canadian 
mortar and small arms rounds."81 The Chinese, 
however, continued to attempt an infiltration of 
the battalion area through Dog company for the 
rest of the night. Each time they were driven back 
by artillery and mortar fire.s 2 By first light, the 
Chinese had withdrawn, and 12 platoon 
reclaimed its former position. At this time, the 
two Vickers MMGs that had been lost hours 
earlier were successfully recovered. Interestingly, 
the Chinese had made no attempt to disable or 
use the No. 1 gun. Not only was it undamaged, 
but over 100 unexpended rounds remained in 
the belt, 83 suggesting that the Patricia gunners 
were indeed hit by "friendly fire." Meanwhile, 
Baker company reoccupied its forward platoon 
position. 
While the men of Dog company were fighting 
for their lives on the battalion's left flank, the 
Chinese infiltrated the Kap'yong River valley, 
severing the supply route leading to Hill677. Cut 
off from the rest of the 27th Brigade, and running 
dangerously low on mortar and small arms 
ammunition, medical supplies, food and water, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stone requested an airdrop 
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Road leading to the northeastjace of Hill 677. Able and Charlie companies were 
located here. The position held by Day company was on the highground to the right. 
of critical supplies at 0430 hours. Six hours later, 
four C-119 "flying boxcars" from an USAF base 
in Japan appeared over the battlefield. The drop 
was an unqualified success, with only four 
parachutes missing their targets. 84 The Patricia 
rifle companies immediately sent parties out to 
collect the supplies and prepared for the enemy 
attack expected that night. At the same time, a 
number of seriously wounded Patricias were 
medevaced by two US Army helicopters. 85 
Fortunately for the exhausted Canadians, no 
further enemy attacks materialized on 25 April. 
The Chinese continued to harass 10 platoon with 
automatic weapons fire for another twenty-four 
hours, but "for the rest of the offensive the enemy 
sought elsewhere for tactical gains."86 By 1400 
hours, the road at the base of Hill 677 was 
reported open and clear of the enemy, and Stone 
requested that additional supplies and 
reinforcements be brought forward by vehicle. 
At this time, the remaining Patricia dead and 
wounded were evacuated. 
* * * * * 
~e Battle of Kap'yong cost the Patricias 10 
J. killed and 23 wounded - a mercifully low 
number of casualties given the intensity of the 
engagementY Not included in the official 
Canadian casualty return were an untold number 
of soldiers who, although not visibly wounded, 
20 
suffered the equally debilitating symptoms of 
post-traumatic stress. A Patricia recounted: 
[After the air drop] we were issued with two 
rations per man. [Corporal] Bishop sat down 
on the edge of his trench and ate two C rations. 
There were three meals in each one. Then he 
went around seeing if anyone had any old ham 
and lima beans they didn't need-"" 
Bishop's voracious appetite was, in part, 
symptomatic of post-traumatic stress.89 For 
most, the physiological effects of post-traumatic 
stress disappeared shortly after the battle. Some, 
however, are haunted by the images of Kap'yong 
to this day. Others have subconsciously blocked 
out the horrific events of 23 to 26 April, and have 
little, or no memory of their role in the battle. 
Indeed, one Patricia from Support Company who 
participated in the defence of Bn Tac HQ has no 
recollection, save for the air drop, of his two days 
and nights on Hill677.90 
On 26 April, 2 PPCLI turned its positions on 
Hill 677 over to elements of the American 1st 
Cavalry Division. During the relief, Lieutenant-
Colonel Stone was given command of the rear 
guard force, aptly known as the "Stone force," 
that covered the withdrawal of the rest of the 28th 
Brigade (the 27th Brigade became the 28th 
Brigade on 25 April). 91 The withdrawal was 
executed without incident, and on 28 April the 
entire 28th Brigade, including 2 PPCLI, moved 
into a reserve area thirty miles east of Seoul. 
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So concluded the Battle of Kap'yong. In 
recognition of the battalion's part in stemming 
the Chinese offensive in central Korea, the 2 
PPCLI, along with the 3 RAR and the American 
Tank Company, was awarded the US Presidential 
citation. Without a doubt, the Canadians had 
earned their citation. The 2 PPCLI had held its 
ground against a numerically superior Chinese 
force, and then conducted an orderly 
withdrawal. 02 As Stone pointed out, "we were 
surrounded by the enemy. We could have run, 
panicked or surrendered. We stayed, fought and 
withdrew on orders in a soldierly fashion. This, 
in itself, was unique in Korea where bug-outs 
were the accepted manner ofwithdrawing."93 
In hindsight, Kap'yong was probably the limit 
of the Chinese offensive in the area. Had their 
objective been further to the south, there can be 
no question that the 2 PPCLI would have been 
wiped out. This does not change the fact that the 
fight for Hill677 was "a good battle, well planned 
and well fought. "SH The Pairicias performed 
magnificently, and their successful retention of 
the height made an important contribution to the 
Commonwealth victory at Kap'yong. When 
compared to subsequent Canadian battlefield 
performance in Korea, the 2 PPCLI's achievement 
at Kap'yong is even more remarkable. The 
question, however, remains: What made the 
Patricias' stand possible? 
There were five primary ingredients in the 
recipe for victory on Hill 677. The first, and most 
important, was the tremendous amount of 
supporting fire available to the 2 PPCLI. It is 
estimated that the New Zealanders alone fired 
approximately 10,000 rounds in support ofthe 
Canadians during the night of 24-25 April.95 The 
exact number of rounds fired by the Americans, 
on the other hand, is less certain. Ian McGibbon 
claimed that A Company of the 2 American 
Chemical Mortar Battalion "fired 1960 [ 120mm] 
rounds in support of the Canadians during the 
night. "s16 Lieutenant-Colonel Stone, however, was 
adamant that "when the battle got hot on the 
Australian front the FOO from the US mortars 
on my front walked out and never a pop did we 
get from his company."97 In any event, the 
supporting fire available to the Patricia rifle 
companies was not confined to New Zealand and 
American sources. The Canadians also relied 
heavily on their own Support Company, which 
fired an untold number of 81 mm and 60 mm 
mortar rounds, and thousands of .50, .303., and 
.30 calibre machine-gun rounds dming the night. 
By covering the gaps between the company 
"islands" of defence and the ridge line approaches 
to Hill677 with accurate, pre-registered artillery, 
mortar and MMG OF tasks, the Patricia rifle 
companies were able to call in a tremendous 
amount of fire power on a relatively small area 
as the tactical situation dictated. 
Despite the pre-eminent role of supporting 
fire on Hill 677, there were other factors that 
ultimately helped to make the Canadian stand 
possible. One was the Second World War 
experiences of the 2 PPCLI's senior officers. By 
carrying out a thorough daylight reconnaissance 
of Hill 677, Stone and his subordinate officers 
were able to detect where the Chinese attacks 
would most likely be directed, and deploy the 
battalion and allocate supporting arms 
accordingly. Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel Stone's 
redeployment of Baker company to cover the vital 
ground on the battalion's right flank probably 
saved the Patricias from disaster. Had Baker 
company not been redeployed, it is likely that 
Bn Tac HQ, the Mortar platoon and the Pioneer 
platoon would have been overrun by the first 
Chinese attack. This would have denied the rifle 
companies the support of the 81 mm mortars, 
and severed 2 PPCLI's communications "with the 
balance of the brigade. "98 The ability to identify 
ground that is vital to the defence of a position is 
a skill that can cnly be acquired through 
operational experie:1ce- experience that Stone 
and many of his of.'icers acquired during two 
years of fighting witl the 1st Canadian Division 
in the mountains of~ >icily and Italy. 99 
Also contributing to 2 PPCLI's success was 
the incorporation of the tactical lessons learned 
by the 29th Brigade into its training program at 
Miryang. As already noted, the battalion arrived 
in Korea an independent, yet untrained, unit. 
With "no rear headquarters closer than Seattle," 
Stone was able to conduct the collective training 
of his battalion as he saw fit. 100 This was a luxury 
enjoyed by no other Canadian battalion 
commander in Korea. By emphasising the tactical 
concepts of company "islands" and all round 
defence in Korea's mountainous terrain, Stone 
prepared his battalion for precisely the type of 
engagement it fought on Hill677. Moreover, the 
CO's emphasis on occupying night-time defensive 
positions under simulated battlefield conditions 
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at Miryang helped inoculate the Patricias against 
the fear and panic of being surrounded. 
Given the above, it is not surprising that 2 
PPCLI's morale remained high throughout the 
fight for Hill677. Despite the apprehension and 
jockeying for position that characterized the final 
hours before the Chinese attack, the soldiers of 
2 PPCLI held their ground and "kept their 
weapons firing." 101 Throughout their terrible 
ordeal the soldiers in the line of fire retained their 
faith in their officers and NCOs, their training, 
and their equipment. As Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stone reminisced, "Kap'yong demonstrated that 
morale, spirit of the troops, or call it what you 
will, is probably the most important factor in 
battle, and all the logistical support, the finest 
plan and the many other factors that are 
considered as requirements to fight a battle, are 
subsidiary to it." 102 Further buttressing the mens' 
morale was the knowledge that if seriously 
wounded, they were only minutes away from 
advanced medical treatment. 103 The medevac 
helicopter was still in its infancy at Kap'yong, but 
its positive impact on morale (not to mention the 
number of fatal casualties) was already apparent. 
Finally, the failure of the enemy to co-ordinate 
and press his attacks must not be overlooked. 
By telegraphing where they were going to attack 
with bugles and tracer bullets, the Patricia 
company and platoon commanders had plenty 
of time to call in DF tasks. 104 In their tight assault 
formations, the attacking Chinese troops were 
literally pulverized when defensive fire was 
brought to bear. Additionally, the enemy's own 
lack of supporting arms ensured that Patricia 
defensive positions were still intact when the 
enemy crossed his start line for the attack. In 
light of these serious tactical shortcomings, one 
can only respect the fortitude and courage of the 
Chinese soldiers who did battle with the 
Canadians on that anonymous Korean height 
known as Hill677. 
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using automatic pistols ( .45 cal 
Ml911A1s) and the cadillac ofStens 
(9 mm Mk.V); where as the line 
infantry were being issued revolvers 
(.38 Smith and Wesson, Enfields) and 
9 mm Mk.ll and Mk.III Stens. 
Looking at only elite formations, 
which was pretty much the case 
concerning the German units who 
fought at Amhem and the uniforms 
that Mr. Anderson looked at, can give 
you a slanted opinion of what the 
other guy is using; you have to look 
at the whole picture. 
As an Airborne soldier, Mr. 
Anderson talks about the Denison 
Smock and he states, "Our normal 
"Dennison" Smock was an excellent 
cover for parachuting, it had 10 
pockets to carry gear, including a 
sleeve for ampules of morphine and 
first aid. The smock was made of 
heavy denim, un-lined, camouflage 
and ideal for fighting in moderate 
weather, but totally inadequate in 
24 
winter." Let us sort things out 
correctly. The Denison 
Smock was produced with four 
exterior pockets that closed by snap 
fasteners, and there was no sleeve for 
ampules of morphine and first aid, 
these features were added by the 
users. It was only designed for 
fighting in the moderate European 
weather not the winter; the Allies 
employed the layering principal for 
fighting in the winter so other items 
of clothing were suppose to be worn 
under and over the Denison Smock 
in winter. 
The Allies tried to rationalize their 
uniform production by attempting to 
produce uniforms that could be used 
for a wide range of applications thus 
saving materials, manpower and 
shipping space when supplying their 
armies overseas. The woolen 
battledress uniform was to be the 
standard building block of the 
Canadian and British uniforms and 
both over and under this could be 
added specific items when needed 
such as long underwear, string vests, 
sweaters, white camouflage smocks 
and this is known as the layer 
principal. The Germans wasted their 
resources producing over a dozen 
patterns of camoullage for three 
different arms of service as well as 
numerous specialty items as new 
units were formed. This stuff is all 
"trendy" even by today's standards, 
but it is certainly not proof of superior 
workmanship. Battledress (BD) was 
a very popular design in the 1940s 
and German U-Boat crews used 
British BD from captured BEF stocks 
on their boats and the German Army 
even copied the design calling it their 
M44 Uniform. By the way, Canadian 
industry has the reputation of having 
produced the best quality BD during 
WWII. 
The Allies did have a problem 
getting the appropriate uniforms to 
the right place on time and getting 
winter uniforms to the front in 1944 
was problem. Mind you this was a 
problem that the Germans had been 
wrestling with on the Eastern Front 
continued on p.88 
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